



Numsa Special National Congress

December 2013

Discussion Document 1

The Challenges Confronting the Labour Movement in the Alliance

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1. Background

1.1 Cosatu 10th Congress

Perhaps, by way of providing a background to this paper, we should recall the jubilant and euphoric atmosphere of the 10th Congress of COSATU in 2009 where, in the Political Report to that Congress, we said:

“This congress must appreciate this moment - this occasion - this conjuncture. We must appreciate the moment when:

- We have dislodged the 1996 class project. Instead of succeeding to force a walk out by the left, it is they that perished into political wilderness.
- The movement is back to its rightful owners - its members. When the democratically elected NEC fosters a new spirit of collectivism that inspired millions of South Africans through a simple message that underscores the new moment - working together we can do more, better!
- Comrade Jacob Zuma is now the President of the ANC and of the Republic of South Africa. He is the worst victim of the politics of backstabbing and use of state institutions tempered by existence of tapes and videos demonstrating the extent to which the NPA and other institutions were manipulated for political ends.
- The deputy President is Kgalema Motlanthe, the former General Secretary of the NUM, a leading and respected member of the COSATU Central Executive Committee.
- The Secretary General of the ANC is Gwede Mantashe also a former General Secretary of the NUM, a leading member of the COSATU Central Executive Committee.
- In the ANC NEC and in the cabinet there are countless former unionists who mostly have retained their loyalty to the basic principles taught in the trenches of the school of Marxism - the university and a factory whose wheels continue to turn, producing some of the finest leaders for our society.
- Ebrahim Patel, that untiring voice of clothing and textiles workers, is now a first ever Minister of Economic Development whose responsibility is to ensure that government's policies works to create decent work. Noluthando Mayende-Sibiya is now the Minister responsible for uplifting women, people living with disabilities and children. Membathisi Mdladlana is the Minister of Labour. Angie Motshega is now the Minister for Basic Education. Ednar Molewa is the Minister of Social Development. Susan Shabangu is the Minister of Mineral Resources. Blade Nzimande is the Minister of Higher Education. Nkosazana Zuma is the Minister of Home Affairs, Sbu Ndebele and Jeremy Cronin, Ministers of Transport. There is a new Minister of Finance, Pravin Godhan. In November there will be a new Reserve Bank Governor - comrade Gill Marcus.

If we cannot make the relationship with our Alliance to work under these conditions then we simply have no capacity to make a relationship to work with anyone else.

If we can't make our relationship with government to work then there will be something wrong with all of us in the Alliance. Equally there will be something wrong with all these comrades in government if they allow the relationship to collapse.

If we cannot succeed with the agenda of decent work and poverty eradication with Jacob Zuma as the President, Kgalema Motlanthe as the Deputy President responsible for poverty eradication, Gwede Mantashe as the ANC Secretary General, Ebrahim Patel as the Minister of Economic Development and Rob Davies as the Minister of Trade and

Industry, then there is little possibility that we can succeed to make any next period that of workers and the poor.

This is the moment that comes once in a long while. We the leaders of the generation largely responsible for this political climate so pregnant with real possibilities cannot afford to squander this moment. Many unions across the globe envy our position today. There is a real possibility that we can expand the shift to the left now experienced in Latin America.

The key and fundamental challenge we face is how do we defend the gains, how do we consolidate and advance them and how do we create a lasting legacy from this moment. It is in this context that the CEC chose this theme **Consolidating working class power in defence of decent work and for socialism**".[End Quote]

1.2 Cosatu 11th Congress

By the time we reached the 11th Congress of COSATU in 2012, the situation had completely changed and the working class, particularly in the mining sector, was restless. The 11th Congress of COSATU took place in the backdrop of the first massacre of workers by the post-Apartheid capitalist state. In the Political Report to the 11th Congress, we had this to say:

"Over the last few years, COSATU has played an increasingly powerful role in shaping the politics of the country. Through its activities, mobilisation and strategic focus, it has assumed the role of leader of progressive civil society. Previously marginalised by those in power, now few key policies or national issues affecting workers are able to move forward without the Federation's input. The organisation's political impact is far reaching, both inside and outside the state.

These strategic political advances by the organisation nevertheless take place in the context of a political environment which is far from ideal:

- Heightened contestation for the soul of the movement, and control of the state, continues between the progressive forces, mobilised behind the Freedom Charter, on the one side, and remnants of the 1996 class project, and the new predator elite, on the other. This contestation takes place at all levels of the state and movement, from local to national, and from leadership to the bureaucracy.
- Contestation between these forces results in constant political zigzagging between different positions, both in the movement and state, leading to widespread and endemic instability and conflict, instead of a coherent political project. This is further complicated by declining political morality, and ideological cohesion, as well as growing nepotism, corruption, and abuse of the movement for selfish accumulation by people in positions of power.
- Given these dynamics, initial advances post-Polokwane in stabilising and consolidating the Alliance, are constantly undermined, and, the Alliance continues to lurch between excellent co-ordination and unity, to dysfunctionality. The Alliance only sees the need to meet when there is a crisis: last time the Alliance Summit met was at beginning of last year.
- Now that we have agreement on a programme, the Alliance partners don't seem to see the necessity to take it forward.
- While important interventions have been made in the movement and the state in an attempt to respond to these developments, lack of consistency by the political

leadership in arresting this situation has meant that we perpetually lurch from temporary advances to political crisis. Because leadership structures are so compromised by these negative features, and contestation by different forces, they appear unable to forge a principled and coherent platform to place our politics on a different trajectory.

In this context, COSATU's political strategy, as set out in our 2015 plan, is at a crossroads: on the one hand, a multi-pronged political strategy of engagement on many fronts is effective in ensuring not only that organised workers have a coherent voice in society, but also that they play a key leadership role.

At the same time, we continue to confront the severe limitations placed on this strategy by an untransformed state; and an ANC, and Alliance which appears unable, for reasons summarised above, to move the country forward. We therefore need to consider whether our current strategy is adequate, and what more, or different, can be done, to move the country onto a new political path". [End Quote].

1.3 Numsa 9th Congress

This political assessment by COSATU came in the aftermath of our 9th National Congress of NUMSA, where we passed several resolutions regarding the Alliance, basically affirming our commitment to participate and to build the Alliance, as a battalion within COSATU. Having painted a rosy picture of the political situation in 2009, our Federation now conceded that:

- Despite an ANC NEC and cabinet with “countless former unionists who mostly have retained their loyalty to the basic principles taught in the trenches of the school of Marxism”, the “context of the political environment is far from ideal”.
- Despite the fine leadership line-up of Polokwane, there continues to be heightened contestation between the progressive forces of the Freedom Charter on the one side, and the predatory elite and the Class of 1996 on the other side, what we at NUMSA called “the forces of socialism and the forces of capitalism”.
- Efforts at stabilising and consolidating the Alliance after Polokwane are constantly undermined,.
- At best, political leadership are confined to managing the effects of this situation. At worst, the leadership continues to act to reproduce these negative features.

1.4 A key task of the Numsa Special National Congress

1.4.1 In short, the Political Report to the 11th Congress of COSATU says plainly that the ANC and the Alliance are unable to take the country forward. It then calls on the working class to “consider whether our current strategy is adequate, and what more, or different, can be done, to move the country onto a new political path”.

1.4.2 This is one of the key tasks of this NUMSA Special National Congress. This paper poses the question: Is the ANC-led Alliance in general, and the way it is currently configured in particular, the best vehicle to pursue a consistent, national democratic revolution as a path to the socialist order in South Africa?

1.5 The purpose of this paper

1.5.1 This paper does not intend to produce new views about the organisational state of the Alliance, its functioning and its ideological state. Neither does it put forward new proposals on the role that the Alliance must play in the national democratic revolution. Instead, this paper provides a summary of the experiences of metalworkers within the Alliance, since the 9th Congress. It provides a synthesis of

the policy positions of the NUMSA CC and NUMSA NEC in relation to the Alliance and its components.

- 1.5.2 In fact, this paper reports that the problems that were identified in the 9th Congress of NUMSA, which were later surfaced in the 11th Congress of COSATU, have become worse. Firstly, the Political Report to the 11th Congress of COSATU makes it clear that, since the 9th Congress of NUMSA, “the Alliance appears unable to take the country forward”.
- 1.5.3 Secondly, as the Political Report to the 11th Congress of COSATU put it, there is heightened contestation for the soul of the movement “at all levels of the state and movement, from local to national, and from leadership to the bureaucracy”. This contestation, as we now know, is playing itself out in the labour movement, necessitating this very Special National Congress of NUMSA and the Special National Congress of COSATU. This paper therefore provides the motivation for this Special National Congress, by showing the urgent need for the NUMSA Central Committee to be provided with a fresh mandate in relation to the Alliance, given our experiences since the 9th Congress.
- 1.5.4 This paper deals with the following issues:
- What did the NUMSA 9th Congress say about the Alliance?
 - What came out of the ANC and the SACP national conferences?
 - What are the political implications of the adoption of the NDP by the ANC?
 - What do these outcomes mean for the working class and the direction of the Alliance?
 - Is this direction the one required by the NUMSA 9th Congress?
 - What emerged out of the 2013 Alliance Summit?
 - What options do we have as NUMSA, COSATU and the broader working class in the light of these developments?

2. What did the 9th National Congress Say About the Alliance?

2.1. Comments on the Alliance

The 9th Congress of NUMSA summarised the experiences of metalworkers in the Alliance as follows:

- a) Joint policy formulation within the alliance remains an important arena of struggle; to date it has failed to be a representative political centre in the arena of policy development and implementation.
- b) Whilst we have made qualitative and quantitative advances in the last period, we continue to hear double talk from within the ANC on macroeconomic policy. There remain conservatives in the ANC who will fight tooth and nail to oppose progressive Alliance agreements.
- c) Disturbing trends in the Alliance at provincial level suggest the imposition of premiers on provinces and the general marginalization of the alliance partners continues despite the fact that we have dislodged the 1996 class project.
- d) The new ANC system of electing candidates opened the process to manipulation under the cover of “community participation”. The ANC is unable to monitor its elected representatives; the toilet saga in ANC municipalities is a good example of this.

2.2. Support for the Alliance

Despite these problematic experiences, we stated categorically that we support the Alliance:

- Its unity and cohesion is in the interests of the working class and the poor, and fundamental to socio-politico-economic transformation towards the attainment of the vision of the Freedom Charter.
- NUMSA will campaign vigorously to establish the Alliance as the Strategic Political Centre tasked to develop a policy framework for the government.
- We must strive for a vanguard and a strong SACP which is able to propagate independently a working class agenda. All unions and NUMSA in particular should contribute in building the SACP as the vanguard of the working class; every class conscious worker should join the SACP.

2.3. How the Alliance should improve

We went further to specify how the Alliance should work to improve its functioning as a political centre. We are of the view that the Alliance:

- Operates jointly, with partners participating equally and independently on matters of national, provincial and local importance to, among other things:
 - Formulate policy: the ANC should not unilaterally adopt or make policy shifts in government without consulting Alliance partners and should consult with the Alliance on certain parliamentary appointments (appointing advisors, consultants).
 - Devise a strategy and structures to ensure that political leaders and government departments implement agreed policies.
 - Influence events in parliamentary structures at all levels.
 - Re-establish its deployment committees at all levels of the Alliance structures, with clearly defined procedures for managing the deployment processes.
- Acknowledges and respects the right of the partners to disagree and works out mechanisms to solve disagreements as soon as they emerge instead of allowing them to be unattended and fester; no partner can discipline the leadership of its allies who are representing the mandates of their own constitutional structures.
- Serves as a forum for the partners to debate and discuss their different positions and as a platform to develop common positions that would be of benefit to the people of the country as a whole.

2.4. Alliance as strategic political centre

2.4.1. In short, our view of the Alliance is that it must, first and foremost be a **strategic political centre** of the entire movement. Delegates to Alliance gatherings must be directly accountable to the structures that elect them. Decisions of the Alliance must be based on consensus. Components of the Alliance are independent and equal partners and therefore reserve the right to differ or agree among themselves. However decisions of the Alliance, because they are based on consensus and consultation, must be binding to all components.

2.4.2. Besides providing a political platform to unite the broadest possible social forces on the basis of the Freedom Charter, the key task of the Alliance is to **formulate a policy framework** for government and to decide on parliamentary appointments, including the appointment of advisors and consultants.

2.4.3. The August 2012 Central Committee of NUMSA noted that, in the immediate aftermath of the Polokwane Conference, there has been some measure of

improvement in the working of the Alliance, especially at the national level. However, it is clear that the Alliance has not yet been acknowledged as the strategic political centre. The ANC continues to demand that it be recognised as the only political centre.

- 2.4.4. We therefore have a situation where it is the programmes of the ANC in government, and not a properly agreed Alliance Programme, that the government implements. Essentially, the formations of the Alliance can ignore each other if they so wish, or at best “influence” each other.
- 2.4.5. It is this untenable situation for the working class that has led Comrade Jacob Zuma and others to insist that the working class needs to find itself in the leadership structures of the ANC. While COSATU has its 2015 Vision focused, among other things, on “swelling the ranks” of the ANC, clearly, we have not done this.
- 2.4.6. Therefore, we do need to have a clear class analysis of the implications for the working class of sending comrades into the ANC national leadership structures in the light of the state of affairs in the Alliance.

2.5. Where we stand now

- 2.5.1. The above summarises NUMSA’s positions in relation to the Alliance in general. The more detailed positions of the union as they relate to specific components of the Alliance will be elaborated below. Nevertheless it must be noted at this stage that our key policies in relation to the Alliance have not been realised.
- 2.5.2. Firstly, the **Alliance is not the strategic political centre** of the entire ANC-led movement, and the ANC has flatly refused to embrace this view. The ANC is the leader of the Alliance. The ANC is also the leader of the national democratic revolution. The ANC is also a strategic political centre of the entire movement. Our formulation has always been that the Alliance should be the strategic centre of power led by the ANC. The ANC is of the view that it is the strategic centre of power and the Alliance is just an “inter-class” Alliance (which in effect, means that the ANC and perhaps SANCO, represents the bourgeoisie in the Alliance).
- 2.5.3. Secondly, though it is debatable whether the policies of government originate from the ANC structures (for example GEAR, the NDP, and many other policies were imposed on the ANC structures), we may say that **the ANC is responsible for government policy, not the Alliance**. That is why the ANC tends to defend whatever policy government pronounces, even when such policies are oppositional to components of the Alliance (e.g. e-tolls, banning labour brokers, youth wage subsidy, privatisation, public-private-partnerships, etc.).
- 2.5.4. Because of this situation, the statement by Comrade Jacob Zuma that workers must take up leadership positions inside the ANC, is indicative of the fact that the ANC leadership, having agreed at the level of the Alliance with certain policy positions, in turn finds itself hamstrung by forces within the NEC that seek to thwart and override Alliance processes. This strategy of “influencing” the ANC by contesting for positions in the ANC shows that the Alliance on its own, as a combination of independent formations with the Freedom Charter as a common strategic programme is not adequate. Workers themselves have to be in the ANC NEC in order for the ANC to “do the right thing”, over and above having an Alliance with the ANC, SACP and SANCO. Despite these problems, The SWOP Survey commissioned by NUMSA found that 60% of NUMSA members say that the Alliance is the best way of serving workers’ interests. The NUMSA Special National Congress must elaborate why this remains the case, even when the Alliance is not a strategic political centre, is not the centre of policy formulation for the movement and as the COSATU 11th Congress Political Report

concluded, is “unable to take the country forward”. Why are NUMSA shop-stewards “stuck in the Alliance”, despite the fact that this Alliance does not contain the elements that they want: it is neither a strategic political centre, nor is it a centre of policy formulation. What is it, then, for workers?

3. What came out of the ANC 53rd Conference?

3.1 Our Assessment of the Policy Outcomes of the 53rd Conference of the ANC

- 3.1.1. In relation to policy outcomes, our main concern is the attitude of the 53rd Conference towards the National Development Plan, which is a development plan that is supposed to be followed over the next 16 years. All other policies are now subordinated to this Plan. Anything that falls outside this plan, or is in conflict with it, will not be implemented. Indeed, despite later self-consolations by the SACP, the NDP is indeed a monument of the movement, as the outcomes of the 53rd Conference clearly show.
- 3.1.2. There are of course, more resolutions on socio-economic policy beyond those specifically related to the NDP. However, the point is that even those resolutions are framed within the NDP, which provides an overarching framework. Therefore, whatever progressive resolutions of the 53rd Conference will be disabled by the overarching neoliberal framework of the NDP.
- 3.1.3. In its “Decade-Long Programme of Action”, the 53rd Conference states in point 15(d) that: “For [organisational] renewal to have a far-reaching transformative impact, it has to propel the process of eradicating unemployment, poverty and inequalities in our society by dealing with structural manifestations of colonialism of a special type”. Therefore in the next decade the movement will not tackle Colonialism of a Special Type. Instead it will embark on a programme of action that will deal with structural manifestations of Colonialism of a Special Type.
- 3.1.4. How then does the 53rd Conference hope to deal with structural manifestations of colonialism in South Africa over the next 10 years?
 - i) Taking urgent and practical steps to build the capacity of the democratic state, within the context of the National Development Plan, so that it can act truly as a developmental state that has capacity to drive and implement our transformation agenda. Ensure that all spheres of government have the human resource capabilities and financial resources to contribute and implement the development and transformation priorities contained in the NDP.
 - ii) Having considered the National Development Plan, agreed that it forms an important basis for the development of a long term plan to build a national democratic society that is non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, united and prosperous and seeks to advance the National Democratic Revolution (NDR).
 - iii) We must work towards the implementation of the recommendations of the 2030 National Development Plan as a long term vision which should serve as a basis for partnerships across society to attain the South Africa of our dreams, as eloquently articulated in the constitution.
 - iv) The ANC must take the lead in mobilising and uniting all South Africans around a common vision of economic transformation that puts South Africa first. The National Development Plan is a living and dynamic document and articulates a vision which is broadly in line with our objective to create a national democratic society, and should be used as a common basis for this mobilisation. The ANC will continue to engage with the plan, conscious of

the need to unite South Africans in action around a common vision and programme of change.

- 3.1.5. The only critique of the NDP from the 53rd Conference was on International Relations, where the 53rd Conference noted that the content of the NDP on international relations needs to be strengthened, the ANC's foreign policy objectives need to be reflected in the NDP, the NDP needs to emphasise the need to change the political economy of Africa away from its colonial and neo-colonial legacy and that the global crisis must be seen as an opportunity for Africa's development and for an alternative continental and global economic system.
- 3.1.6. The Central Committee of NUMSA differs with the attitude of the 53rd Conference towards the NDP. In its 7 March 2013 statement, the NUMSA CC reported that it held a frank and robust debate on the National Development Plan (NDP) as endorsed by the 53rd National Conference of the ANC held in Mangaung, as a vision for the country. The CC noted with great concern that the NDP has been elevated to a status above the Freedom Charter, and appears to have sent into oblivion the RDP.
- 3.1.7. The CC holds the view that the NDP is embedded in the failed neoliberal economic framework of GEAR as religiously pursued and imposed on the ANC and the democratic government by the 1996 Class Project. The CC view is that the NDP is a downright neoliberal Plan because:
- i) It leaves intact, and protects the power relations of Colonialism of a Special Type in post 1994 South Africa;
 - ii) It is therefore a major right-wing deviation from the Freedom Charter and thus gives further momentum to the derailment of a socialist-oriented NDR;
 - iii) GEAR is indeed a living and growing document; it had 66 pages in 1996; it has now grown to 430 pages in the form of the NDP.
 - iv) As NUMSA we have consistently argued that there are very strong, incontestable similarities and parallels between the NDP and DA policy.

Specifically we have argued that the NDP:

- i) Does not provide a plan on how to transform the economy in line with the Freedom Charter objectives, let alone in order to bring about the society and economy it purports we will have 20 or more years from now;
- ii) Plans to roll-out infrastructure to further reinforce raw mineral export dependence; this is geared towards serving mining capital and not broad-based industrial development;
- iii) Minimises the role of the state in the economy;
- iv) Seeks to de-regulate the labour market further and to further weaken working class power;
- v) Operates within the neo-liberal macroeconomic framework, and thus offers no hope for fundamental social and economic transformation.

- 3.1.8. If we have characterised the NDP in these class terms, as a neoliberal plan, a major rightwing deviation from the Freedom Charter, it is therefore a straightforward conclusion that the leadership that uses the NDP as a basis to mobilise the progressive social forces around a common vision is also a "neoliberal", "rightwing" leadership. In short, our conclusion is that the leadership that emerged in Mangaung is a bourgeois leadership.

3.2 Our Assessment of the Leadership Outcomes of the 53rd Conference of the ANC

- 3.2.1 Our Central Committee, in its statement of 7 March 2013, came to the conclusion that, with respect to leadership in the NEC and Top Six – the Central Committee is unanimous that the leadership that has emerged cannot be defined as a working class orientated leadership in view of the following;
- i. The Deputy President of the ANC is a class representative of international and local Capital and cannot be the hope for the working class if the Marikana massacre is anything to go by;
 - ii. From within the ranks of COSATU, some of those nominated into the NEC were quick off the mark to launch an offensive against the COSATU General Secretary and NUMSA labeling us as workerists, syndicalists and counter revolutionaries.
 - iii. The decision of the NUMSA and COSATU General Secretaries not to accept nomination (outside of the original NUMSA and COSATU decisions) was considered necessary given the ulterior plans of right-wing forces in the national liberation movement to make them lame ducks, isolate and liquidate their contribution in the movement.
- 3.2.2 It is not difficult to ascertain the class ideology of the other leading cadres of the ANC NEC. For example, during his tenure as the Premier of KZN, the National Treasurer of the ANC forged ahead in agreement with the DA, to implement the “youth wage subsidy”. The then Premier never engaged with the COSATU critique and alternative proposals that COSATU brought forward but pushed ahead with the youth wage subsidy.
- 3.2.3 The Chairperson of the ANC is currently mired in a muddy BEE deal with Gold Fields. There are question marks regarding this deal. What is clear from a basic class point of view is the extent to which white monopoly capital has penetrated the top structures of the movement. We cannot even rule out the extent to which leading cadres of the movement are involved in labour broking and also see in the youth wage subsidy an opportunity to accumulate at the expense of the working class. The same can be said about the E-tolls saga.
- 3.2.4 The Deputy Secretary General has labelled our union a “populist” union for opposing the NDP, which we consider to be a bourgeois programme. She sings the same song as the bourgeois apologists, the song of “policy stability” and “investor confidence”. Her defence of the NDP and her attack on NUMSA proceeds from a bourgeois, populist ideological standpoint, which has been appropriately explained in our public engagement with her. For example, she claims that “the entire nation” supports the NDP, without any sense of class analysis of the so-called “entire nation”.
- 3.2.5 In our NEC document about “Ideological Reflections on the Recent Attacks on NUMSA”, we found the Secretary General of the ANC very divisive in pitting General Secretaries against Presidents within unions. We also found it problematic, when the Federation is being brought down to its knees by the “heightened contestation” for its soul, that he paints General Secretaries as bad people and Presidents as good people, based on what we consider to be a flawed conception of “worker leadership”. His statements serve to reinforce divisions among the leading cadres of the Federation and to plant a seed of divisions within unions, which assists the bourgeoisie to push through its policies. Objectively in this regard, his actions weaken working class organisation and advance bourgeois interests.
- 3.2.6 The President of the ANC, despite our objections to the NDP, instead of going easy on this matter and consulting the Alliance, pushed ahead to align all government programmes and the national budget towards the NDP, in precisely the same way he did with the now practically defunct New Growth Path Framework. The NDP is not

an Alliance policy, in the same way as the New Growth Path Framework is not. The NDP is a DA policy that was subsequently endorsed by the ANC. Its class orientation remains bourgeois and its ideology remains neoliberal. Objectively, by not subjecting this policy document (and others) to Alliance processes and testing it among the working class forces of the Alliance, the President gave power to the bourgeoisie and simply ignored working class concerns.

- 3.2.7 The above observations do not of course constitute a rigorous class analysis of the leadership, but they do provide indications about the class character of the ANC leadership that emerged from Mangaung and the programme that this leadership is tasked to implement, the NDP. Since our view is that the NDP is a neoliberal document, the leadership that implements it cannot escape being a bourgeois leadership.

4. Outcomes of the SACP 2012 National Congress

4.1. On the Policy Outcomes of the 13th Congress of the SACP

- 4.1.1. As NUMSA we have not properly assessed the outcomes of the SACP Congress. The main document for the SACP is the South African Road to Socialism (SARS). In that document, the SACP calls for a radical National Democratic Revolution. It states that “the NDR has to be a revolutionary struggle to transform the underlying, systemic features of our society that continue to reproduce race, gendered and class oppression.

Which is to say: The NDR in our present conjuncture has, in essence, to be a struggle to transform the dependent-development accumulation path of our economy, and the chronic underdevelopment that this accumulation path still daily reproduces” [see p.41].

- 4.1.2. Like the ANC’s Programme of Action that is aimed at “manifestations” of colonialism and not the underlying root causes, the SARS views the NDR as a struggle to transform “the *underlying, systemic features* of our society”, and not to tackle the relations of production that define South African society and it fails to outline the line-up of class forces that spring from such relations of production.
- 4.1.3. Thus, the SARS dismally fails to delineate, from a dialectical and materialist point of view, the progressive class forces that should be mobilised, to isolate the primary enemy class force in this phase of the NDR, and to point those class forces that should be neutralised. All that the SARS tells us in this regard is that the “SACP has consistently believed that it is possible and necessary to advance and develop a national democratic revolutionary strategy of this kind that unites, in action, a range of classes and social strata”. It fails to concretely specify this “range of classes and social strata” on the one hand and the enemy classes on the other.
- 4.1.4. In its articulation of the SARS, the 13th Congress of the Communist Party does not for once raise the property question, which class owns the means of production in South Africa and how exactly, are these means of production to be wrestled from that class. In Chapter 4 of the SARS, the Party completely evades the question of nationalisation and dismally fails to explain how the working class will take over the mines, banks and monopoly industries—the Party talks about “socialisation” in the context where it has not elaborated in concrete terms how the ownership of these key sectors is to be wrestled from imperialism and white monopoly capitalism.
- 4.1.5. The SARS document further advances a dubious vision of socialism, based precisely on the emergency situation faced by Cuba, envisioning a de-mechanised socialist agriculture driven by ox-drawn ploughs! In Chapter 5, the SARS articulation of the

attitude of the Party to state power falls into a technicist-type analysis of the “state apparatus”. As to whether the Party will independently contest for elections, depends on “conjunctural realities”. Whilst correctly noting the ownership by the apartheid state of the means of production (e.g. SASOL), the SARS itself divorces the question of state power from ownership of the means of production. It does not conceptualise alternative forms of organisation of working class state power, beyond the existing “state apparatus”. All the Party seeks to achieve is “working class hegemony over the state” (i.e. “working class hegemony over the current state apparatus”).

- 4.1.6. The SARS approach to the economy is also inadequate. Whilst noting that the “commanding heights of the economy” are dominated by private monopoly capital, its proposals fall far too short of being “radical”. For example, the SARS document simply calls for a multi-pronged strategy for the “socialisation of the commanding heights of the economy”. As to what this multi-pronged strategy concretely entails the SARS fails to elaborate. In relation to the financial sector, the SARS document focuses on state and workers’ pension funds and completely ignores the private monopoly capitalist banking and insurance industry and does not even call for a state bank (which the ANC, at least, does).
- 4.1.7. In short, the SARS approach to the economy is not radically different in its content to a typical government or ANC ETC discussion document, except that the SARS document seeks to “socialise” without nationalisation. The main thing in the SARS is its evasiveness in dealing directly with white monopoly capitalist and imperialist ownership and control of the South African economy. Interestingly, the property question is sharply raised and is at the centre of the analysis in the eloquent Road to South African Freedom of 1962. In its 21st Century Marxism, the South African Road Socialism severely waters down the property question as the leading question of the revolution and presents a vision of socialism that is backward.
- 4.1.8. The above observations do not constitute a rigorous analysis of the Programme of Action of the Communist Party, but it does indicate the ideological crisis and theoretical challenges that the Party is facing. As NUMSA we have ourselves to blame for not infusing within the Party the perspectives of the industrial proletariat. That the Party now toys with ideas such as socialist agriculture driven by ox-drawn ploughs in the 21st Century, which is cruelty to animals, in the context where the advantages of socialism can be fully realised with advanced mechanisation to save labour, reflects peasant socialism taking over in the Party not the socialist ideas of the industrial proletariat.
- 4.1.9. What is interesting is that the SARS says nothing about the NDP, despite the fact that the NDP is a long-term Plan to be implemented, ostensibly to forge the so-called “national democratic society”. Nevertheless the Party did ultimately provide its own systematic views on the NDP, which we enthusiastically welcomed with a view to engage in detail.
- 4.1.10. In our 26 May 2012 Central Committee statement, we stated that our campaign for the withdrawal of the National Development Plan has awakened the working class: a number of organisations had come out in support of some or all of our perspectives. Our Federation, COSATU, joined us in being very critical of the NDP. The Gauteng Provincial Working Committee of the ANC has supported our position. The YCL issued a statement which raises a fundamental critique of the NDP.
- 4.1.11. The SACP leadership seemed to have retreated from its initial blanket endorsement of the NDP. We however noted with concern that the SACP discussion document on the NDP continued to characterise NUMSA as ‘rejectionist’ and further accused us of ‘self-dispossession’. We recognised that the view of the SACP leadership had

converged with ours in one respect. They agreed with us that Chapter 3 on the Economy and employment does not reflect an appropriate strategy for the economy. Where our views diverge is that for us any vision or plan that is founded on a false economic analysis, and thus on a faulty programme must be fundamentally and irretrievably flawed.

- 4.1.12. We stated our steadfastness on the view that the NDP must go. We do not think it is even necessary to be Marxists, which we are, to recognise that the economy is the foundation of any National Development Plan. So if its view of the economy is wrong, we must start again. The leadership of SACP, on the other hand, seems happy to support the plan on the basis that it is not cast in stone.
- 4.1.13. Our question to the leadership of the SACP is this: If the fundamental chapter on the South African economy is taking us in the wrong direction, how can we accept that the plan as a whole is a good basis for discussing our future? We maintained that the NDP is a monumental error for South Africa in general and the Liberation Movement in particular!
- 4.1.14. In short, from the policy point of view, the outcomes of the 13th Congress of the SACP are too far from satisfactory. The SACP's attitude towards the NDP is extremely ambivalent and reflects an ideological confusion. The SACP discussion document is in fact, more an apologist and defensive response to NUMSA's attack on the NDP than it is a response to the NDP as such. We will not go into the detail of what the Party says about the NDP here, except to say that it essentially provides an apologetic defence of the NDP against NUMSA's perspectives. The same applies in relation to the SACP's position on e-tolls, where the SACP tends to trivialise COSATU's opposition to e-tolls as a form of privatisation.

4.2. Assessment of the Leadership Outcomes of the 13th Congress of the SACP

- 4.2.1. The leadership of the SACP saw a change with the creation of an additional position for Deputy General Secretary. This increased the top leadership of the Party to Six. Of the Six top leaders, only two are practically full time office bearers. The General Secretary is a Minister of Higher Education and Training, the First Deputy General Secretary was a Deputy Minister of Transport, before being re-deployed to the Ministry of Public Works. The Deputy National Chairperson is a Minister of Public Works, while the National Treasurer is a Member of Parliament.
- 4.2.2. The relationship between NUMSA and the SACP has basically degenerated to the lowest levels in our history as a union. In our 01 September 2012 Central Committee statement, in the aftermath of the SACP 13th Congress, we reflected very frankly about the consistent negative political posture of the SACP against NUMSA as an organization and in particular its leadership. We stated our extreme annoyance by certain opportunistic stances taken by the leadership of the SACP in particular its General Secretary Comrade Blade Nzimande.
- 4.2.3. We went on to explain that Comrade Nzimande came to NUMSA's 9th Congress and called on NUMSA not to raise the issue of deployment of SACP cadres in the state in public. The NUMSA Central Committee rejected these double standards from leaders of the SACP who speak in forked tongues and accuse NUMSA of being populists who like to grandstand in front of the media and television; when the SACP launched its un-Marxist attack on NUMSA at its 13th Congress it was in full view of the media.
- 4.2.4. We were extremely disturbed by the fact that for almost the whole year the SACP leadership has been warning everybody about various tendencies that have engulfed COSATU unions, ranging from business unionists, demagogues, populists, anti-majoritarian liberal offensives, and so on. We were all warned of these tendencies that have engulfed COSATU and its affiliates. Meanwhile, no affiliates or names of

individuals had been mentioned and everybody had to go in search of warm bodies behind these tendencies. We were all advised to look for these people who are very dangerous and whom the SACP has vowed to “defeat” because these people are the gravest danger and threat to the NDR.

- 4.2.5. However this now open and now hidden cheap strategy was exposed in the SACP Congress; the Report delivered by Comrade Blade Nzimande was very clear that the SACP has a good relationship with all COSATU unions but there was one union that was presented as a problem: NUMSA, and- in particular its leadership. NUMSA took exception to this attack. However we are quite clear now that singling out of NUMSA was not neutral. Its main political intention was to isolate NUMSA among other affiliates so that it must have absolutely no political influence, but also present its leadership as a problem with a view to isolate it from its constituency; the intention can only be to liquidate our organizational influence and our leadership.
- 4.2.6. NUMSA further rejected the allegation that it seeks to position itself as a vanguard of the SACP resolutions. However we pleaded guilty for using the historic accumulation of revolutionary theory of the SACP as a guide to revolutionary praxis today, to militant working class action; as we see ourselves as a union inspired by Marxism-Leninism.
- 4.2.7. We continued to raise our concerns about the migration of the SACP leadership into the state. We maintained that the SACP needs to guard its revolutionary independence and autonomy by having its key leadership, such as the general secretaries, full time in office, all the time. We further maintained that the working class has a duty to safeguard the revolutionary independence and autonomy of the SACP, as the political insurance of the working class in the multi-class NDR, by having its key leadership, such as the general secretaries, full time in office, all the time and not immerse itself in the trappings of the capitalist state.
- 4.2.8. Our CC statement expressed a hope that the newly elected leadership of the SACP will respond positively to the call we have made consistently for more than 2 years to have an urgent bilateral engagement with the South African Communist Party (SACP) to deal with the ill-conceived perceptions that NUMSA is anti-SACP including its elected leadership. This bilateral never happened. The Party only responded to NUMSA’s repeated requests for a Bilateral too late, when the Federation was already too deep into the throes of a political crisis, after the SACP General Secretary had attacked NUMSA in the POPCRU Political School.
- 4.2.9. We frankly are of the view that the SACP currently plays an extremely divisive role in the trade union movement. All the labels that were poured at the 13th Congress turned out to refer to NUMSA (and the General Secretary of COSATU, Cde Zwelinzima Vavi). Even the Secretary General of the ANC could not help but be divisive, pitting General Secretaries and Presidents of unions against each other, and further attempting to isolate the NUMSA leadership from the membership in his public utterances. We concluded that there is nothing Marxist-Leninist about these behaviours, as they violate the basic tenets of communist behaviour as laid out in the Communist Manifesto.
- 4.2.10. In our 11 July 2013 NEC statement, we raised concerns about the ideological orientation that we saw emerging within the SACP, as articulated by the SACP General Secretary in Justice Malala’s “The Justice Factor”. In that statement, we noted that the SACP disapproved of NUMSA’s view that the NDP is a carbon-copy of DA policies, and left viewers with an impression that, other than the economy and economy-related chapters, the NDP contains “quite good” proposals.

- 4.2.11. To substantiate his point he quoted the NDP chapter on Human Settlements and only articulated generalities. What was furthermore worrying to us was his complete denial that neoliberalism continues to dominate South Africa's policy-making. The General Secretary of the SACP has now told the entire nation that all the above features have now disappeared; there is no neoliberalism in South Africa under Cde Jacob Zuma's administration.
- 4.2.12. We differed with this view and we promised to elaborate our perspective further in our reflections on the SACP's stance on the NDP, including evaluating whether it is correct to suggest that other chapters in the NDP are "quite good". We, however, underlined that we stand by our position that the NDP is a carbon copy of DA policies.
- 4.2.13. Overall, we are extremely worried that the SACP is now playing the role of being an apologist of neo-liberalism and furthermore elaborated on what we see as the problematic role of the SACP in deflating working class militancy and providing cover for the continued domination of white monopoly capitalism and imperialism in our country.

5. What do the outcomes mean for the working class and the Alliance direction?

5.1. NDP

- 5.1.1. In assessing the outcomes of the 53rd Conference of the ANC, the Central Committee of NUMSA stated, in its 7 March 2013 statement, that the NDP will reproduce the same results we have suffered under the current neoliberal economic trajectory – mass poverty, rising unemployment and deepening inequalities, mostly affecting the Black working class, including the marginalised and despondent youth of country.
- 5.1.2. After a thorough analysis, the CC came to the extremely disturbing conclusion that significant and strategic parts of the NDP were directly lifted from DA policy documents, especially its Chapters on economic restructuring, infrastructure, role of the state, agriculture and rural development. The fact that the ANC has adopted the NDP, now buries whatever differences existed between it and the DA on matters of socio-economic transformation.

5.2. Implications of Mangaung

- 5.2.1. In our statement of 7 March 2013, particularly in its assessment of the implications of the 53rd Conference outcomes for the working class, the Central Committee of NUMSA also concluded as follows:
- iv. Mangaung failed to break new ground towards a radical second phase of the National Democratic Revolution. There was no sign of the fundamental transformation of the South African economy, which remains in the hands of white monopoly capital and imperialism.
 - v. The adoption of the NDP amounted to a postponement of the key challenge of resolving the triple crisis of poverty, unemployment and inequality until 2030. It is also, in our view, fundamentally incompatible with the core tenets of the Freedom Charter.
 - vi. Nationalisation was dumped, thereby prioritising the interests of business confidence rather than the plight of the working class and the poor in our society - NUMSA *will continue to champion the nationalisation of the commanding heights of the economy. In this regard we must mobilise broader society for the implementation of the Freedom Charter*

- vii. The engagement of delegates in the Mangaung conference, which expressed the need for a revolutionary programme of action, did not find expression in the policy formulations and this is a political practice inherited from the culture of the Class of '96. Effectively, the revolutionary programme of the Freedom Charter was replaced with the neo-liberal programme of the NDP- NUMSA *CC re-affirms the need to continue with the S77 Notice which calls, amongst other things, for the implementation of the Freedom Charter, the banning of Labour Brokers, the scrapping of e-tolling and the scrapping of the National Youth Wage Subsidy.*

5.2.2. These are profound observations, since they simply mean that ideologically, when it comes to socio-economic perspectives, the ANC and the DA are not different. The simple question to be posed is: Do DA policies provide a basis to mobilise progressive social forces behind the National Democratic Revolution? If the answer is a resounding NO, then what is it that will make DA policies deliver different results in the hands of the ANC? The Special National Congress must therefore iron out the practical political implications of the conclusions made by the Central Committee.

5.3. Implications of SACP 13th Congress

5.3.1. In relation to the 13th Congress of the SACP, we did not conduct a thorough assessment. However it is clear from the Party's SARS Programme, which evades nationalisation and fails to clearly articulate the line-up of class forces in this phase of the revolution, the subsequent policy positions of the SACP, especially on the NDP and on such as issues as e-tolling (as particularly reflected in the views of the First Deputy General Secretary in his debate with our General Secretary), that we should not expect forward movement coming from the SACP.

5.3.2. In summarising the implications of the outcomes of the SACP 13th Congress and ANC 53rd Conference, the 26 May 2013 statement of the NEC of NUMSA concluded boldly that "our strategic direction will not take us forward". The NEC was referring to the strategic direction that is being pursued by the Alliance.

5.3.3. The NEC noted that there is resistance to nationalisation of the commanding heights of the economy both on the advice and in the interest of the ruling class. There is open refusal to deal with super-exploitation of black and African labour, which has been the backbone and dominant accumulation strategy of South African capitalism. There has been a refusal to take drastic measures to deal with Section 25 of the constitution which defends the property owning class and its wealth. This is despite the failure of the willing buyer willing seller approach to address the property question in general and the land question in particular, post 1994.

5.4. The state of the Alliance

5.4.1. The NEC further reflected on the history of our Alliance. The ANC Conference in Polokwane promised that the side-lining of the Alliance would be addressed and the Alliance would be reconfigured. The SACP resolved its debate on State Power with an agreement to reconfigure the Alliance. It was agreed that there would be an Alliance Council.

5.4.2. Despite all this, the reality is that the Alliance was not reconfigured – it simply evaporated. The last Alliance Summit was in 2010.

5.4.3. It has become clear that the only function of the Alliance is to be an electoral machine. Indeed an Alliance Summit was called later in 2013, on the eve of the 2014 elections. We reject that approach. In the view of the NEC, COSATU must take forward our working class struggles in the June and October Alliance Summits. Our clear demands were captured in the COSATU Congress.

5.4.4. But at the same time we recognised that the Alliance is only one platform in the battle which must be fought on all fronts. The ANC must understand that its undemocratic unilateralism in implementing E-tolling and the NDP is not in its own interest as the oldest National Liberation Movement.

5.4.5. We concluded by saying that we will continue to mobilise the working class.

6. Is the direction the one required by NUMSA's NC in 2012?

6.1. Our strategic direction will not take us forward

6.1.1. Perhaps to understand NUMSA's position with regard to the direction that is being pursued by the SACP and the ANC, it is important to re-iterate 26 May 2013 statement of the NEC of NUMSA, which concluded boldly that "our strategic direction will not take us forward".

6.1.2. We specifically decried the endorsement of the NDP and its Diagnostic in our statement of 19 March 2013, where we concluded, among other things that:

- i. Both the Diagnostic Report and the NDP are based on a false, theoretically weak analytical foundation - in a thinly veiled attempt to conceal the underlying false neoliberal assumptions about South Africa and its development challenges.
- ii. We find that the NDP is not anchored around the dynamic to destroy "Colonialism of a Special Type" (CST) post 1994, in South Africa, and thus it easily joins the many false promises of development in South Africa post 1994.
- iii. Thus we suggest that everything about the NPC needs to be redone in order to define properly what it is, where it must be located and what it must do, in post 1994 South Africa.
- iv. Of course we reject the NDP as not being rooted in the historic mission of the Liberation Struggle in South Africa and for being anti the Freedom Charter, anti-working class interests and ultimately not in the best interests of the VAST MAJORITY of South Africans. It is a document that protects the historic and vested white monopoly and imperialists capitalist interests in South Africa, and presents this defence as a basis for the gradual evolution of a "New South Africa".

6.2. ANC strategic direction not in line with Numsa's

6.2.1. There is clearly an "emerging, moderate non-racial centre" in South Africa post 1994, which has its ideological origins in the DA and now has solid roots in the ANC itself, hence the "adoption" of the NDP by the ANC in Mangaung, of which the DA aptly says:

"The adoption of the DA'S vocabulary throughout the NDP is striking. It borrows much of the same analytical framework that underpins our own political philosophy - the 'open, opportunity society for all.'"

6.2.2. From the above, it is clear that the direction that has been adopted by the ANC and the SACP is not in line with NUMSA's perspectives. The continuing divergence between NUMSA and the SACP, and the high levels of disappointment with the ANC are clear indications that NUMSA is not in agreement with the direction that is being pursued by the Alliance. Specific issues include, but are not limited to:

- The Alliance as a strategic political centre
- The total ban on labour brokers
- E-tolls
- Youth wage subsidy

- Nationalisation
- Macroeconomic policy
- National Development Plan

7. What are the political implications of the adoption of the NDP by the ANC?

7.1. The ANC leadership is not working class orientated

7.1.1. In order to draw the political implications of the adoption of the NDP by the ANC, we need to understand how the ANC process of arriving at policies is subject to extensive manipulation. In our statement of 2 August 2012, we noted that the propertied class manipulates the internal democratic processes of the liberation movement.

7.1.2. The CC was firm that we need a working class biased leadership of the ANC and a leadership collective that has the political will to implement the Freedom Charter. NUMSA is of the view that, within the reservoir of the alliance, we should be able to ensure that the ANC emerges with leadership that is rooted in the working class and that does not seek to change its liberation character.

7.1.3. The worst thing that we can do would be to allow a situation where the ANC in Mangaung is dominated by leadership that is rooted in the capitalist class; in South Africa today we have got enough right-wing political parties, including the DA.

7.1.4. By the 7 March 2013, we had come to the conclusion that, with respect to leadership in the NEC and Top Six elected in Mangaung – the Central Committee is unanimous that the leadership that has emerged cannot be defined as a working class orientated leadership. The ANC emerged with a bourgeois leadership.

7.2. ANC processes are subject to manipulation

7.2.1. This was not surprising because the manner in which the aspirations of the ANC branches were suppressed and distorted in the interests of protecting white monopoly and imperialist domination of South African society became obvious, beginning with the 2010 National General Council. For example, on 2 September 2012, our Central Committee decried the fact that the ANC Policy Conference was held under the radical slogan of a “Second Transition” that later became the “Second Phase of the Transition” calling for a radical program. Six out of nine ANC provinces demanded nationalization of the key strategic sectors of the economy.

7.2.2. The ANC Policy Conference endorsed the demand for nationalisation. It firmly endorsed the nationalization of the key strategic sectors of the economy, what can be called “commanding heights” of the economy. What was extremely disturbing for NUMSA was the open attempt by the leadership of the movement not to announce the majority decision taken by the branches of the ANC.

7.2.3. For NUMSA such ambivalence was problematic because if the leadership of the movement is not democratic in championing majority decisions and subscribing to democratic centralism, for NUMSA this is something that must be defeated as it could seriously compromise discipline in the organization, and destroy the organisation.

7.3. Numsa Special Congress must deliberate on the implications

7.3.1. Given this situation, the Special National Congress has to deliberate the practical political implications and the way forward. As far as the Central Committee and the National Executive Committee of NUMSA is concerned, the Class of 1996 represented bourgeois interests which took precedence in the ANC. Once again we are poised to be subjected to the same bourgeois ANC leadership with its 15-year National Development Plan.

7.3.2. NUMSA therefore cannot accept the political leadership that has emerged in the Alliance, nor can we accept the current ideological orientation of the SACP leadership, if we truly believe in the Freedom Charter as the most direct programme towards a socialist South Africa. We would have to convince ourselves, for example, that the shareholders at Lonmin and Goldfields will lead a successful socialist-oriented NDR.

8. What emerged out of the 2013 Alliance Summit?

8.1. The summit took place with Cosatu paralysed

The 2013 Alliance Summit, which got postponed a few times due to lack of preparation, took place in the context of a paralysed and weakened Cosatu due to factional battles and whose General Secretary was the subject of a vote of no-confidence the CECs of February and May 2013. The Cosatu GS ultimately got suspended as a result of a sexual encounter with a junior employee. A Cosatu meeting of Presidents and General Secretaries agreed that the Alliance Summit should be postponed because Cosatu itself had done very little preparation for the Alliance Summit.

8.2. What emerged from the Summit

8.2.1. We know now that an Alliance Task Team was established to take forward the disagreements on policy perspectives (a postponement as always of the class contradictions in this intra class alliance).

8.2.2. What we can glean from the Alliance Declaration is the following excerpts which tells a thousand stories;

- Together, we reaffirmed our commitment to what the ANCs 2013 Mangaung national conference resolved as our line of march - the imperative of advancing, deepening and defending a radical second phase of our democratic transition. ***This necessarily implies that the adoption of the NDP is amongst the things we regard as our line of march and that the Alliance Task team is just a sweetener or lollipop.***
- Alliance partners commended government for substantial advances with the state-led infrastructure plan and growing success with industrialisation efforts, including significant growth in the level of infrastructure spending, doubling over the past five years. ***Endorsing a state-led infrastructure that has shown our imperialist forces are lining up to become the main beneficiaries if the Transnet shenanigans are anything to go by.***
- The Summit welcomed governments Green Paper on Land Reform and specifically the recommendation to:
 - establish a Land Valuer General, to determine the value of land earmarked for restitution and redistribution; and
 - provide for a single four-tier tenure system that envisages freehold, with limitations on the extent of privately-owned land, and parameters for leasehold by private individuals on state and public land.

No nationalisation of the land or an advance of the Cosatu policies on land and agrarian reform.

- The Summit agreed that there are significant areas of agreement across the Alliance in our approach to the National Development Plan:
 - All Alliance parties agree there is the need for national long range planning, and the National Planning Commission has made a contribution to this process;
 - The Alliance agrees the planning work of the National Planning Commission needs now to be more effectively institutionalized and taken forward within the state. At the same time, external advisory planning capacity contained in the NPC remains important.
 - The NDP is a living document, not cast in stone, and needs to be adapted, where appropriate.
 - Where there is agreement on the positive elements, such as the need for a capable developmental state, we shall push ahead with implementation. The recently concluded public sector services charter between government and unions, is a good example of this, as are the important NDP recommendations on fighting corruption, and spatial transformation.
 - The SACP and COSATU have raised a number of concerns with certain aspects of the NDP, including the economic chapter. The Alliance recognises that these concerns are legitimate and will be addressed by the Alliance Task Team.
- The Alliance Summit strongly affirmed the commitment of all our formations to campaign actively to ensure, once more, an overwhelming electoral victory of the ANC and the broad movement it leads at next year's polls. It said:
 - We are convinced that the constructive deliberations and important resolutions of this Summit will help to inform our election manifesto and to build our unity in action as an Alliance and with the great mass of South Africa's people, as we move boldly towards advancing, deepening and defending a radical second phase of our democratic transition.
 - We commit ourselves to all of this inspired by the need to build a united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and more egalitarian South Africa together with all our people of South Africa.
- There is No Freedom Charter guiding the 2014 government elections because as we know now, the NDP will be the bedrock of the ANC's Manifesto. We also know now that Cosatu has been effectively side-lined in the development of the Manifesto. The ANC has opted to ask citizens (be they IFP, DA or anything else) to shape the ANC's manifesto.

Not once in this Alliance Summit Declaration is the Freedom Charter mentioned
– Not once!

9. What options do we have as NUMSA, COSATU and broader working class in light of these developments?

9.1. What has Numsa been saying

9.1.1. In our statement on matters before the courts, written on 11 September 2013, we noted that:

- The SACP General Secretary and ANC Secretary General has in fact demonstrated for all of South Africa to witness that they want to use COSATU to advance the neo-liberal National Development Plan (NDP) which in essence is a surrogate of Growth Employment & Redistribution (GEAR) to the point of whipping everyone in line.
- The ANC is on record through the ANC President and Secretary General as saying that the Freedom Charter is not ANC policy. This lie goes against the fact that the ANC adopted the Freedom Charter as ANC policy in 1956. We know that the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) was the first within the Alliance to have adopted the Freedom Charter in 1955.
- NUMSA makes an appeal to all politically conscious workers to rise and defend the federation from rightwing capture and destruction, such as we have seen of other working class formations, by the insidious, neoliberal, kleptomaniac and corrupt right wing tendency in the Liberation Movement.
- This rightwing tendency wants to reduce COSATU to a toy telephone and a simple labour desk for itself. This rightwing tendency has abandoned the Freedom Charter and now replaced it with the neoliberal National Development Plan (NDP).
- This rightwing tendency works to destroy the independence of working class formations and drives their being swallowed into its rightwing agenda. We know that in fact there is today no ideological difference between this right wing and the DA, save for their skin colour.
- This right wing, which is responsible for the accelerated integration of South Africa into the world capitalist imperialist system, and for the abandonment of the Freedom Charter, now is lying to the working class that in fact it wants to save COSATU from capture by imperialism!!
- History will judge us extremely harshly and unkindly, if we fail to win the war to return COSATU to its rightful owners, the working class, and to its correct ideological and political orientation and culture, Socialism.

9.1.2. We further elaborated, by way of “Ideological Reflections”, in our NEC document, how the Alliance has basically served to defend the interests of imperialism, and how specific leaders of Alliance components fan divisions within the trade union movement.

9.1.3. Thus, on 29 August 2013, our Central Committee noted with serious concern that the recent POPCRU political school was used by the ANC Secretary General and the SACP General Secretary to launch a factional attack on NUMSA.

9.2. Numsa under attack

9.2.1. The democratic right of NUMSA to convene a Special National Congress to review what is happening with respect to the crises in COSATU, the ANC’s adoption of the NDP in Mangaung and the forthcoming 2014 elections, was rubbished by these two senior leaders of the national Liberation Movement with all sorts of insinuations and threats made against NUMSA and its leadership.

9.2.2. More disappointing is the fact that our Vanguard which is meant to unite the working class has taken a sectarian and factional approach to the crises in COSATU. NUMSA has

received a written request from the SACP for a bilateral meeting. Our Central Committee is not averse to such a meeting but we wish to prepare properly for such an engagement including assessing why we would be attacked by the SACP General Secretary but on the same platform requesting an engagement with NUMSA.

9.2.3. We subsequently provided a detailed response through our “Ideological Reflections”, to these attacks, through our NEC discussion document.

10. What questions must the Numsa Special Congress debate?

- 10.1. What is the state of the alliance?
- 10.2. What is the future of the alliance?
- 10.3. What do we think all the Cosatu representatives who were elected onto the ANC NEC at Mangaung have achieved?
- 10.4. What are the alternatives to the Alliance?

11. Conclusion

- 11.1. We conclude this paper with a quotation from the NUMSA NEC statement of 26 May 2013, which states that: “the reality is that the Alliance was not reconfigured – it simply evaporated. The last Alliance Summit was in 2010. It has become clear that the only function of the Alliance is to be an electoral machine”.
- 11.2. We also conclude with a quote from the Political Report to the 11th Congress of COSATU, which states: “We continue to confront the severe limitations placed on this [2015] strategy by an untransformed state; and an ANC, and Alliance which appears unable... to move the country forward. We therefore need to consider whether our current strategy is adequate, and what more, or different, can be done, to move the country onto a new political path”.
- 11.3. NUMSA, through its own structures, has come to a realisation that the NDR is off track and that the direction that the Alliance is pursuing will not take us forward. The question is: For how long will the working class continue to lament, like a broken record, about the same things in this Alliance? Such is the fundamental question that the NUMSA Special National Congress must resolve.